بررسی تاثیر سازوکارهای حاکمیت شرکتی بر تقلب در صورت‌های مالی شرکت‌های پذیرفته شده در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران

•   آرشیو : نسخه زمستان 1403
•   کد پذیرش : 12239
•   موضوع : حسابداری
• نویسنده/گان : | زهرا طهمورثی
•   زبان : فارسی
•   نوع مقاله : پژوهشی
•   چکیده مقاله به فارسی : حاکمیت شرکتی نقش مهمی در تضمین کیفیت فرآیند گزارشگری مالی ایفا می‌کند. بسیاری از شکست‌های شرکتی اخیر قابل انتساب به حاکمیت ضعیف است که در قالب گزارشگری مالی متقلبانه و مدیریت سود نادرست نمود پیدا کرده‌اند. از این رو، هدف این پژوهش بررسی تاثیر سازوکارهای حاکمیت شرکتی بر تقلب در صورت‌های مالی است. برای تحقق این هدف، شرکت‌های متقلب با استفاده از علایم خطر مورد اشاره در استاندارد حسابرسی شماره 240 با عنوان "مسئولیت حسابرس در ارتباط با تقلب و اشتباه در صورت‌های مالی" و با بکارگیری تکنیک‌های داده‌کاوی غیر نظارتی مشخص شدند. در ادامه جهت انجام پژوهش سه فرضیه طراحی شد که رابطه بین ترکیب هیات مدیره، تمرکز مالکیت و مالکیت نهادی با تقلب در صورت‌های مالی را در بین شرکت‌ها و در طی دوره زمانی مورد نظر بررسی می‌کند. بنابراين، براي آزمون فرضيه هاي پژوهش روش آماري "داده هاي تابلویی" بکار گرفته شده است. دوره زماني مورد مطالعه برای هر یک از فرضیه‌های پژوهش، سال هاي 1381 تا 1393 و نمونه انتخابي شامل 182 شرکت است. نتایج حاصل از تخمین فرضیه‌های پژوهش نیز حاکی از این است که صرفنظر از اهرم مالی، سودآوری، ترکیب دارایی‌ها، نقدینگی، کارایی، اندازه و رشد، بین ترکیب هیات مدیره، تمرکز مالکیت و مالکیت نهادی با تقلب در صورت‌های مالی رابطه معناداری وجود دارد.
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•   کلمات کلیدی به فارسی : ترکیب هیات مدیره، تمرکز مالکیت، مالکیت نهادی، تقلب در صورت‌های مالی.
•   چکیده مقاله به انگلیسی : Corporate governance plays an important role in ensuring the quality of the financial reporting process. Many of recent corporate failures have been attributed to poor governance, which manifested in fraudulent financial reporting and earnings mismanagement. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on financial statements fraud of the listed companies in Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE). To achieve this aim, Board Composition, Ownership Concentration and Institutional Ownership were used as corporate governance mechanisms. Furthermore, nineteen red flags of fraud extracted from auditing standard No. 240 along with Data Mining techniques such as K-Means clustering used to discriminate financial statements fraud cases. The data sample is restricted to 182 companies in the (TSE) during 1381 to 1393. In conducting this research, three main hypotheses were proposed to examine the impact of board composition, ownership concentration and institutional ownership on fraudulent financial reporting across the firms and during the designated period. Accordingly, the statistical technique known as the “Panel Data” was exerted to test the research hypothesis. The results of the hypotheses testing demonstrate that fraudulent financial reporting is negatively affected by proposed corporate governance mechanisms, after controlling for potential confounding effects.
•   کلمات کلیدی به انگلیسی : Board Composition, Ownership Concentration, Institutional Ownership, Financial Statements Fraud.
•  صفحات : 1-17
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